Sapio CTV Emulators

Sapio CTV Emulators defines implementations of the emulator trait that can be used by sapio compiler library users. This includes wrapper types that compose instances of an emulator into a federated multisig.

This crate also defines logic for servers that want to offer emulator services.

See Sapio CLI for how to run a server.

How it works

See the source code for more detailed documentation.

CheckTemplateVerify essentially functions as a self-signed transaction. I.e., imagine you could create a public key that could only ever sign a transaction which matched a certain pattern?

To implement this functionality, we use BIP-32 HD keys with public derivation.

On initialization, a server picks a seed S and generates a root public key K from it, and publishes K.

Users generate a transaction T and extract the CheckTemplateVerify hash H for it. They then take H and convert it into a derivation path D of 8 u32's and 1 u8 for non-hardened derivation (see hash_to_child_vec).

This derivation path is then applied to K to generate a key C. This key is added with a CheckSig(SIGHASH_ALL) to the script in place of a CTV clause.

Then, when a user desires to spend an output with such a key, they create the entire transaction they want to occur and send it to the emulator server.

Without even checking to see that the key is used in the transaction, the server generates the template hash H' (which should equal H) and then signs, returning the signature to the client.

Before creating a contract, clients may wish to collect all possible signatures required to prevent an availability fault.

This scheme has the benefit that:

1. contract specification can occur without any online processes
2. The server has no intelligent logic, all guarantees are structural.
3. Server is completely stateless.
4. Availability/malfeasance can be controlled for with multisig
5. 1:1 functionality mapping to CTV

The downside of this approach to emulation is that:

1. It is somewhat inefficient for scripts which have many branched possibilities.
2. No inherent mechanism to delete keys after use to protect against future exfiltration.

Why BIP-32

We use BIP-32 because it is a well studied primitive and derivation paths are compatible with existing signing hardware. While it is true that a tweak of 32 bytes could be directly applied to the key more efficiently, easier interoperability with existing tools seemed to be the best path.