Lib.rs

› bytemuck › Reviews

These reviews are from cargo-vet. To add your review, set up cargo-vet and submit your URL to its registry.

The current version of bytemuck is 1.15.0.

1.14.0 (older version) unknown

From kornelski/crev-proofs copy of salsa.debian.org.

Only in debcargo (unstable). Changelog:

  • Team upload.
  • Package bytemuck 1.14.0 from crates.io using debcargo 2.6.1
    • Closes: #1056178
  • Re-enable derive feature. (Closes: #1042882)
  • Set collapse_features=true

cargo-vet does not verify reviewers' identity. You have to fully trust the source the audits are from.

safe-to-run

This crate can be compiled, run, and tested on a local workstation or in controlled automation without surprising consequences. More…

does-not-implement-crypto (implies crypto-safe)

Inspection reveals that the crate in question does not attempt to implement any cryptographic algorithms on its own.

Note that certification of this does not require an expert on all forms of cryptography: it's expected for crates we import to be "good enough" citizens, so they'll at least be forthcoming if they try to implement something cryptographic. When in doubt, please ask an expert.

crypto-safe
Implied by other criteria

All crypto algorithms in this crate have been reviewed by a relevant expert.

Note: If a crate does not implement crypto, use does-not-implement-crypto, which implies crypto-safe, but does not require expert review in order to audit for.

safe-to-deploy (implies safe-to-run)

This crate will not introduce a serious security vulnerability to production software exposed to untrusted input. More…

ub-risk-2 (implies ub-risk-3)

Negligible unsoundness or average soundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-2

ub-risk-3 (implies ub-risk-4)
Implied by other criteria

Mild unsoundness or suboptimal soundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-3

ub-risk-4
Implied by other criteria

Extreme unsoundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-4

unknown

May have been packaged automatically without a review

These reviews are from Crev, a distributed system for code reviews. To add your review, set up cargo-crev.

The current version of bytemuck is 1.15.0.

1.4.1 (older version) Rating: Positive Thoroughness: Medium Understanding: Medium

Approved without comment by inflation on 2021-11-08

1.2.0 (older version) Rating: Positive Thoroughness: Low Understanding: Low

Approved without comment by kornelski on 2020-06-15

1.2.0 (older version) Rating: Positive Thoroughness: Medium Understanding: Medium

by HeroicKatora on 2020-02-08

The crate gained quite a bit of interface since last time. I'm not quite sure how I feel about this at the moment but understanding definitely suffered from it.

Of most concern is definitely TransparentWrapper which relies on the internal implementation detail that the layout of a pointer type itself does not change for transparent wrappers. This premise seems a very unlikely to be invalidated from changes but nevertheless departs with only relying on stabilized and fully RFCed properties.

Other than that, no critical changes and a continued trend of being cautious. Notably the implementation of Contiguous guards against bad implementations despite being unsafe to implement, the offset_of macro is completely safe(!)—a welcome change for such macros—and there are MIRI tests in CI.

The test suite could be a lot bigger but some tests are obviously foiled by MIRI rejecting some sound and UB-free code that relies on alignment checks, to avoid those incidentally succeeding in unsound code.

1.1.0 (older version) Rating: Positive Thoroughness: Medium Understanding: High

by HeroicKatora on 2020-01-10

Show review…

The implementation is rather conservative on many fronts and requires very strong, sometimes even unnecessary, preconditions for all operations. But this makes reasoning easier since you work with a consistent set of assumptions. This is in contrast to zerocopy which has at three differing sets.

The biggest leap of unsafety is the assumption that slices strides and arrays agree with the size of their elements. This is not quite likely to change, ever, but it should be noted nevertheless. The exact wording of Pod also allows us to smuggle a type through its requirements. It takes some care to try and only allow types that might violate the assumption by requiring a defined repr but in its wording forgets that repr(packed) can be applied to repr(rust). Thus, the following type conforms to the wording but not the spirit behind it.

\#[repr(packed)] struct BadSize(u16, u8)

The easiest fix would be to explicitly list the requirement that the size is divisible by the alignment. This defines the stride to agree with the size.

1.1.0 (older version) Rating: Strong Positive Thoroughness: High Understanding: High

by Lokathor on 2019-12-11

This is my crate. It's been in careful development for several months now, and it keeps everything as minimal and simple as possible to avoid any possible unsoundness.

Lib.rs has been able to verify that all files in the crate's tarball are in the crate's repository with a git tag matching the version. Please note that this check is still in beta, and absence of this confirmation does not mean that the files don't match.

Crates in the crates.io registry are tarball snapshots uploaded by crates' publishers. The registry is not using crates' git repositories, so there is a possibility that published crates have a misleading repository URL, or contain different code from the code in the repository.

To review the actual code of the crate, it's best to use cargo crev open bytemuck. Alternatively, you can download the tarball of bytemuck v1.15.0 or view the source online.