Lib.rs

An OpenPGP certificate linter.

This program checks for and can fix issues with OpenPGP certificates. The current focus is on the use of SHA-1, which has been successfully attacked, and was deprecated by NIST in 2011:

Since 2005 SHA-1 has not been considered secure against well-funded opponents, as of 2010 many organizations have recommended its replacement. NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011 and disallowed its use for digital signatures in 2013. As of 2020, attacks against SHA-1 are as practical as against MD5; as such, it is recommended to remove SHA-1 from products as soon as possible and use instead SHA-256 or SHA-3. Replacing SHA-1 is urgent where it's used for signatures.

This program checks for the following issues:

• Certificate revocations that use SHA-1.
• Whether a User ID's current self signature uses SHA-1;
• Whether a subkey's current binding signature uses SHA-1; and,
• Whether a signing-capable subkey's current backsig uses SHA-1.

sq-keyring-linter can fix all of these issues in a straightforward manner:

$ gpg --export-secret-key 4BE50C526C743502 | cargo run -- --fix | gpg --import
Certificate 4BE50C526C743502 is not valid under the standard policy: No binding signature at time 2020-11-26T22:32:12Z
Certificate 4BE50C526C743502 contains a User ID ("SHA1 User ID, SHA256 Subkeys <sha1-user-id-sha256-subkeys@example.org>") protected by SHA-1
Certificate 4BE50C526C743502, key CC6387BFA4D9263D uses a SHA-1-protected binding signature.
Examined 1 certificate.
  0 certificates are invalid and were not linted. (GOOD)
  1 certificate was linted.
  1 of the 1 certificates (100%) has at least one issue. (BAD)
0 of the linted certificates were revoked.
  0 of the 0 certificates has revocation certificates that are weaker than the certificate and should be recreated. (GOOD)
0 of the linted certificates were expired.
1 of the non-revoked linted certificate has at least one non-revoked User ID:
  1 has at least one User ID protected by SHA-1. (BAD)
  1 has all User IDs protected by SHA-1. (BAD)
1 of the non-revoked linted certificates has at least one non-revoked, live subkey:
  1 has at least one non-revoked, live subkey with a binding signature that uses SHA-1. (BAD)
1 of the non-revoked linted certificates has at least one non-revoked, live, signing-capable subkey:
  0 certificates have at least one non-revoked, live, signing-capable subkey with a strong binding signature, but a backsig that uses SHA-1. (GOOD)
gpg: key 4BE50C526C743502: "SHA1 User ID, SHA256 Subkeys <sha1-user-id-sha256-subkeys@example.org>" 2 new signatures
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:         new signatures: 2

(The diagnostics and the summary are printed to stderr; any fixed keys are printed to stdout and encoded using ASCII Armor.)

If you run it again, no issues will be detected:

$ gpg --export-secret-key 4BE50C526C743502 | cargo run -- --fix | gpg --import
Examined 1 certificate.
No issues found (see `/tmp/keyring-linter/debug/sq-keyring-linter --help` for a list of issues that are checked for).
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: Total number processed: 0

You can examine the signatures that sq-keyring-linter creates using, for instance, pgpdump:

$ gpg --export-secret-key 4BE50C526C743502 | cargo run -- --fix | pgpdump
...

In our experience, Sequoia's output is a bit more readable. You can either use sq packet dump or https://dump.sequoia-pgp.org/.

Note: by default sq-keyring-linter does not export secret key material as this is usually not needed. You can override this by passing --export-secret-keys.

You can check whether one or more OpenPGP certificates have issues as follows:

$ dpkg -l debian-keyring
...
ii  debian-keyring 2020.09.24
$ cargo run -- /usr/share/keyrings/debian-keyring.gpg
...
Examined 885 certificates.
  1 certificate is invalid and was not linted. (BAD)
  884 certificates were linted.
  203 of the 885 certificates (22%) have at least one issue. (BAD)
0 of the linted certificates were revoked.
  0 of the 0 certificates has revocation certificates that are weaker than the certificate and should be recreated. (GOOD)
26 of the linted certificates were expired.
858 of the non-revoked linted certificates have at least one non-revoked User ID:
  165 have at least one User ID protected by SHA-1. (BAD)
  102 have all User IDs protected by SHA-1. (BAD)
834 of the non-revoked linted certificates have at least one non-revoked, live subkey:
  160 have at least one non-revoked, live subkey with a binding signature that uses SHA-1. (BAD)
228 of the non-revoked linted certificates have at least one non-revoked, live, signing-capable subkey:
  10 certificates have at least one non-revoked, live, signing-capable subkey with a strong binding signature, but a backsig that uses SHA-1. (BAD)

From the above output, we can see that the current Debian keyring has 885 certificates. One certificate is considered invalid by Sequoia and was skipped. Of the rest, 203 (22%) use SHA-1 in some way. These should be fixed.

You shouldn't screen scrape the above output. If you want to programmatically identify which certificates have an issue, use the --list-keys option, which prints the fingerprint of each certificate with an issue to stdout and like --quiet suppresses the diagnostics and statistics:

$ cargo run -- --list-keys /usr/share/keyrings/debian-keyring.gpg
124124BD3B4862AF7A0A42F100B45EBD4CA7BABE
7733B328D2795F5BE2325ADD01509D5CAB4AFD3F
...