#signature #public-key #crypto

lms-signature

Pure Rust implementation of Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures (RFC 8554)

1 unstable release

0.0.1 Apr 16, 2024

#165 in #public-key

Apache-2.0 OR MIT

105KB
2K SLoC

RustCrypto: Leighton-Micali Signatures

crate Docs Build Status Apache2/MIT licensed MSRV Project Chat

This repository contains implementations of Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures (RFC 8554).

Security Notice

LMS signatures are stateful: Users must take care to never sign more than one message with the same internal LM-OTS private key. To avoid catastrophe, state must be maintained across multiple invocations of the signing algorithm.

When using our LMS implementations, the internal counter (q) will be incremented before each signature is returned.

If the LMS private key is persisted to storage, you MUST update the persistent storage after each signature is generated and before it is released to the rest of the application. Failure to adhere to this requirement is a security vulnerability in your application.

For a stateless hash-based signature algorithm, see SLH-DSA.

NOTE: this project has not been externally audited, but the entire codebase was internally reviewed by cryptographers at Trail of Bits.

Installation

cargo install

Usage

Our implementation uses strongly typed private and public key types.

let mut rng = thread_rng();
let mut seckey = lms::lms::PrivateKey::new::<LmsSha256M32H10<LmsOtsSha256N32W4> > ( & mut rng);
let pubkey = seckey.public();   // of type lms::lms::PublicKey<LmsSha256M32H10>
let sig    = seckey.try_sign_with_rng( & mut rng, "example".as_bytes()).unwrap();
let sig_valid = pubkey.verify("example".as_bytes(), & sig).is_ok();

We can generate LMOTS signatures in the same way using lms::ots::PrivateKey instead.

Key Management

We do not require much from the user in terms of key management. Any internal state changing operation uses mutable reference to update the internal state. When persisting private keys to long term storage, users must be very careful that the same private key is never read from disk twice. This would create two private keys in the same state and thus when they are both used to sign a message, the LMOTS private keys will have been reused, which is considered not good.

License

All crates licensed under either of

at your option.

Contribution

Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.

Dependencies

~0.8–1.1MB
~22K SLoC