2 releases (1 stable)
|1.0.0||Aug 28, 2020|
|0.5.0||Aug 28, 2020|
#5 in #csr
Caramel Client Rust
Rust Caramel client and Library
What is it
Caramel is a simple Certificate Authority (CA) that lets users set up their own root CA, sign clients & servers, and thereby identify machines to machinse using TLS (Transport Layer Security) with Client Certificate Authentication.
This is a client that communicates against a Caramel Server.
It is responsible for:
- Generating Private Keys
- Creating CSR (Certificate Sign Requests)
- Posting said CSR to the Caramel Server
- Fetching signed certificates from the Caramel Server
Why use it
We use it for machine-to-machine authentication. By adding a systemd service or a cron-job to create and maintain a Private Key and Certificate for machines to authenticate against other machines, we eliminate the need for computer-accounts and/or service passwords.
Common use-cases for us are:
- Log upload from servers to other servers
- Authenticating client-apps to database-servers
- Deploying Keys & Certificates for Monitoring services (Zabbix)
- Web-application to API authentication
Licensed under either of
- Apache License, Version 2.0, (LICENSE-APACHE or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0)
- MIT license (LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
at your option.
Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.
For developers, these are some of the basic scenarios that this crate should be able to fulfill, either as a stand-alone application, or as a library embedded in other software.
Log client certificate & Key handling
In our infrastructure we want to authenticate uploading log-files to the log-server using TLS with client certificates.
For this reason we have set up a separate CA for the log infrastructure, and want to deploy a tool to all machines that submit logs.
The tool is launched by a systemd service and timer to keep the certificates up-to-date.
[Unit] Description=Refresh Caramel Certificate for %i After=network.target Wants=network-online.target [Service] Type=oneshot Environment=CARAMEL_CA=ca.example.com Environment=CARAMEL_CN=service.example.com Environment=CARAMEL_CERT_DIR=/var/lib/example/tls/ WorkingDirectory=/var/lib/example/tls/ ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/caramel-client $CARAMEL_CA $CARAMEL_CN
This service is then triggered with a timer, and/or depended upon by other services using a simple drop-in file.
The above unit will then make sure that in /var/lib/example/tls/ there are a files for CA certificate, Private Key, and a signed Certificate file for other applications to use.
In this use-case, the caramel-client generates a Private Key, Certificate Sign Request, and then continues to poll the server for a signed certificate, only finally exiting with success once the CA has signed the request.
This is because following services will require a certificate to continue succesfully, thus they are supposed to wait until a certificate has been received. Therefore, the simplest mode of the client is to loop forever as it waits for the server to sign the request, something that requires manual work by an administrator.
As the servers have administrators watching over them, there is no need to automatically attempt to recover from error situations, and it's important to fail with a good error message for administrators to be able to track the status of the application.
Embedded client application
On embedded firmware, we do not want to ship a large amount of public CA certificates, and want to protect us against MITM/Man In The Middle) and other interesting problems, so we embed the CA certificate with the hardware.
For this use-case, the client is called by other applications, thus signifying the status of the key with an return-code, and never blocking or looping.
In these cases, there is no administrator to access or debug, thus the client needs to be able to automatically recover, usually by starting over "from scratch" in case of certain error-codes from the Caramel server.
Here, the application uses a "well known" serial number from hardware, or the MAC address of the device, as their client-id.
Unlike the command-line client above, the CA certificate should be able to use one specified elsewhere, and the Private Key and Certificate are stored in a single well-known file with specific ownership and permissions.
To avoid concurrent invocations causing trouble, the key file is
(Exclusive, returning an unspecified error-code if another process is in
progress) while it is working with Keys and/or CSR-requests, thus causing an
error-code exit if the program is started concurrently, which it can be, as
multiple different tools will each attempt to start the well-known "Make sure
we have keys" application if a key does not exist.
To facilitate debugging and monitoring, the Client ID is part of the user-agent in this mode of operation.
And to further grant identification, if the client deems that it has a useable CA certificate, it defaults to passing a client certificate to the server.
This client also compares the time-stamp of the server-side and our local certificate, and doesn't fetch the file new in case it hasn't been updated, in order to save bandwidth on metered connections.
Status codes in use:
- Succesful request: 0
- Unchanged file: 0
- Locked file: 1
- Pending signature: 69
- Misc error: 127
- Rejected: Wipe key, CSR and start over
Embedded library application
On mobile devices (smartphones) the library is used in the background to facilitate API connectivity. The first time the application is started it generates a new UUID and Key, and posts that to a Caramel Server in the background.
The caramel server is configured to automatically sign all previously unseen UUID-based requests, thus the client can almost instantly get a certificate.
At this step, an anonymous user has a distinct and trusted identity to the server, while still being able to be anonymous.
If the service then requires it, a proper user authentication step can happen, using fex. OAuth or email call-back to tie a user identity to this device's account.
For thise use-case, it is important to never attempt to store a file directly to disk, and only return file-like objects that can be stored in system key-chains or per-application databases.
Using the container
# podman pull registry.gitlab.com/modioab/caramel-client-rs/client:latest # podman run -ti --rm=true -v $(pwd):/data:rw registry.gitlab.com/modioab/caramel-client-rs/client:latest CA.EXAMPLE.COM TEST-CERTIFICATE-PLEASE-IGNORE