#tor #controller #tokio #onion


torut is reasonable tor controller written in rust utilizing tokio for async communication

10 releases

0.1.9 May 3, 2021
0.1.8 Mar 31, 2021
0.1.7 Nov 24, 2020
0.1.6 Oct 6, 2020
0.1.1 Jan 4, 2020

#47 in Science

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817 downloads per month
Used in 12 crates (2 directly)

MIT license



Build Status

Torut is tor controller written in rust similar to stem or bine. It tries to reasonably implement specification of tor control port proto It works asynchronously with tokio and async/await.

It implements onion service key and address generation and serialization on it's own without tor process.

Right now logic is quite tightly coupled with tokio so there is no way to remove tokio from dependencies and make all functions synchronous.

Security considerations

Right now comparing keys/onion services IS NOT CONSTANT TIME which may lead to leaking some values. All constant time compared types are explicitly marked at least in their documentation.

Also please note that this library is relatively new and may contain bugs(and dynamically changing APIs) thus I personally think that it should not be used for any security critical project yet.

This crate is of course as safe as tor instance that you are using so keep your software up to date.

Right now it uses 1.0.0-pre.3 version of ed25519-dalek library for v3 onion services The library may not be well-established yet until 1.0 release will be available.

Attack scenario

So one may think that torCP client is not an attack surface but it may lead to deanonymization of client under some circumstances(or even RCE in case of bug in tor or "feature" of tor control protocol intended for trusted input but it's much less probable. Tor has really good security history compared to other C projects). Imagine that RESOLVE command is implemented badly and input is untrusted(for example we resolve domain from some email software)

Then attacker can put domain like: example.com\r\nDROPGUARDS so command looks like RESOLVE example.com\r\nDROPGUARDS\r\n

which would cause DROPGUARDS command to be issued on tor instance. Knowing timing of when this happened eavesdropper may try to deanonymize client.

Less important security considerations

Right now it also does not implement server authenticity check when one is connecting to tor control protocol but it's hardly an issue. Once implemented it may prevent us from using cookie in wrong tor process instance in best case. Right now we do not reveal cookie event if connected to wrong tor process anyway due to how HMAC works.

Unsafe code

Right now this crate uses #![forbid(unsafe_code)] annotation which means that it contains 0 unsafe code blocks so it should not be a concern despite the fact that usually(almost always) tor process is considered trusted.

Usage considerations

In case there is no OpenSSL installed on your target machine you can embbed it into rust binary. In order to do that use vendored_openssl feature.


Tests in torut are split into two parts: these which do use tor and these which do not use tor. In order to enable tests which use tor use RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=testtor" and provide TORUT_TESTING_TOR_BINARY environment variable containing path to tor binary. Testing tor binary MUST be run with --test-threads=1 for instance like:

$ RUSTFLAGS="--cfg testtor" cargo test -- --test-threads=1

Please also note that some of tests may fail against older versions of tor(for instance with apt-get installed one on default ubuntu installation)


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