5 releases (3 breaking)

0.4.0 Nov 27, 2022
0.3.0 Jul 25, 2021
0.2.1 Jul 3, 2021
0.2.0 May 17, 2021
0.1.0 May 10, 2021
Download history 23/week @ 2022-08-14 24/week @ 2022-08-21 15/week @ 2022-08-28 27/week @ 2022-09-04 31/week @ 2022-09-11 28/week @ 2022-09-18 30/week @ 2022-09-25 44/week @ 2022-10-02 18/week @ 2022-10-09 13/week @ 2022-10-16 27/week @ 2022-10-23 33/week @ 2022-10-30 37/week @ 2022-11-06 48/week @ 2022-11-13 123/week @ 2022-11-20 81/week @ 2022-11-27

292 downloads per month
Used in 3 crates (via libp2p-quic)


742 lines

Noise for the quinn quic implementation

Handshake pattern

The IK handshake pattern is used with an optional psk. The psk allows for private p2p networks using a pre shared key. In a p2p context the static keys are known and the IK handshake allows for 0-rtt encryption. Identity hiding isn't a concern in many p2p networks.

    <- s
    -> e, es, s, ss, psk  || client transport parameters || 0rtt-data
    <- e, ee, se          || server transport parameters || 1rtt-data

Identity and key exchange

Signing keys are used as identities in p2p networks. Because the IK handshake requires prior knowledge of the handshake key, the signing key is reused for the key exchange. An ed25519 key is converted to an x25519 key using the algorithm as implemented by libsodium.

NOTE: while it is likely ok to reuse the key for singing and diffie hellman it is strongly advised not to reuse the key for other protocols like VRF or threshold signatures.

Crypto algorithms

Using xoodyak (a finalist in the on-going NIST light weight crypto competition), the following sequence of operations are performed for deriving the 0rtt-key, 1rtt-key and next-1rtt-key. For fast authenticated encryption a chacha8poly1305 cipher is used.


The session transcript is initialized with the protocol identifier. The client ephemeral and server static public keys, and the es dh are absorbed into the session transcript. From this session transcript a session identifier is extracted which is used to initialize a keyed session transcript as per the xoodyak paper section 3.3 authenticated encryption with a common secret. The encrypted client static public key, the ss dh and the psk which defaults to [0; 32] if none was provided are added to the session transcript. Then the encrypted ALPN string used to identify the application protocol and the encrypted client transport parameters as defined by the quic spec are added to the transcript. Common ALPN strings are h3 for web or libp2p for libp2p applications. Finally an authentication tag for the crypto frame and 0-rtt keys are extracted.

The initial packet's crypto frame contains the protocol identifier, the client ephemeral public key, the encrypted client static public key, the encrypted ALPN identifier, the encrypted client transport parameters and an authentication tag. After the initial packet 0-rtt packets can be sent using the extracted 0-rtt key without having to wait for a response from the server.

  | Cyclist({}, {}, {})
p | Absorb("Noise_IKpsk1_Edx25519_ChaCha8Poly")
p | Absorb(e)
  | Absorb(s)
  | Absorb(es)
  | key = Squeeze(32)
  | Cyclist(key, {}, {})
c | Encrypt(s)
  | Absorb(ss)
  | Absorb(psk)
c | Encrypt(alpn)
c | Encrypt(client_transport_parameters)
t | Squeeze(16)
  | initiator-0rtt-key = SqueezeKey(32)
  | responder-0rtt-key = SqueezeKey(32)

After receiving an initial packet the server produces a handshake packet containing the encrypted server ephemeral public key and the encrypted server transport parameters. After the handshake packet 1-rtt packets can be sent. Once all 0-rtt packets have been acked the keys are discarded.

c | Encrypt(e)
  | Absorb(ee)
  | Absorb(se)
c | Encrypt(server_transport_parameters)
t | Squeeze(16)
  | initiator-1rtt-key = SqueezeKey(32)
  | responder-1rtt-key = SqueezeKey(32)

During the transport session the 1-rtt keys might need to be rotated. This happens when approaching u64::MAX sent packets or if forced by the connection. See the quic spec for details.

Key rotation:
  | Ratchet()
  | initiator-next-1rtt-key = SqueezeKey(32)
  | responder-next-1rtt-key = SqueezeKey(32)

QUIC version

Reserved versions for quinn-noise are 0xf0f0f2f[0-f] [0]. Currently only 0xf0f0f2f0 is a valid quinn-noise version.

Header protection

Header protection/obfuscation serves to prevent middle boxes from reading the header. Modification is not possible since the header is passed as associated data to the cipher. The idea is that if the header changes in a future quic version, middle boxes may drop the packets because they can't read the header. But header protection/obfuscation only makes it harder not impossible. Due to being questionable if it serves it's purpose it was decided that no header obfuscation is applied.

Retry mechanism

The retry mechanism is identical to what is specified in the quic-tls spec.


MIT OR Apache-2.0


~280K SLoC