#mac #zero-knowledge #anonymous #credential #algebraic-mac

nightly no-std aeonflux

Composable, lightweight, fast attribute-based anonymous credentials with infinite (aeon) rerandomised (flux) presentations using algebraic message authentication codes (aMACs), symmetric verifiable encryption, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs

2 unstable releases

0.2.0 Nov 24, 2020
0.1.0 Jun 18, 2020
0.0.0 Sep 22, 2018

#586 in Cryptography

BSD-3-Clause

130KB
2K SLoC

aeonflux

Composable, lightweight, fast attribute-based anonymous credentials with infinite (aeon) rerandomised (flux) presentations using algebraic message authentication codes (aMACs), symmetric verifiable encryption, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.

These are largely based on the credentials in 2019/1416.

Features

Currently, we only support revealed credential issuance; that is, a user reveals all the attributes on their credentials to the issuer when requesting a new credential. When presenting said credential afterwards, attributes may be either hidden or revealed.

Credential attributes may be either scalars (integers modulo the group order, a large prime) or group elements. This library provides a way to encode arbitrary byte arrays to group elements---which may then be encrypted and decrypted---in an invertible manner, such that arbitrary strings can be stored as attributes.

Group element attributes which are hidden upon credential presentation are symmetrically encrypted, such that the user can prove to the issuer their correctness in zero-knowledge, while sharing the symmetric decryption key with other third parties. This allows for uses such as the issuer performing some external verification of personally identifiable information, such as an email address or a phone number, when the user requests a new credential, without the issuer being able to track this data afterwards; however the user can still share the data with other users. Another example use case is storing a shared key, in a way that all users who have access to the key can prove knowledge of it in zero-knowledge later, thus allowing for arbitrary namespacing and/or access control lists.

Warning

While this library was created by a cryptographer, it hasn't yet been reviewed by any other cryptographers. Additionally, while I may be a cryptographer, I'm likely not your cryptographer. Use at your own risk.

Usage

extern crate aeonflux;
extern crate curve25519_dalek;
extern crate rand;

use aeonflux::issuer::Issuer;
use aeonflux::parameters::IssuerParameters;
use aeonflux::parameters::SystemParameters;
use aeonflux::symmetric::Plaintext;
use aeonflux::symmetric::Keypair as SymmetricKeypair;
use aeonflux::user::CredentialRequestConstructor;

use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;

use rand::thread_rng;

// First we set up an anonymous credential issuer.  We have to specify
// the number of attributes the credentials will have (here, 4),
// but not their type.
let mut rng = thread_rng();
let system_parameters = SystemParameters::generate(&mut rng, 4).unwrap();
let issuer = Issuer::new(&system_parameters, &mut rng);

// The issuer then publishes the `system_parameters` and the
// `issuer.issuer_parameters` somewhere publicly where users may obtain them.
let issuer_parameters = issuer.issuer_parameters.clone();

// A user creates a request for a new credential with some revealed
// attributes and sends it to the issuer.
let mut request = CredentialRequestConstructor::new(&system_parameters);

// Revealed scalars and revealed points count for one attribute each.
request.append_revealed_scalar(Scalar::random(&mut rng));
request.append_revealed_scalar(Scalar::random(&mut rng));
request.append_revealed_point(RistrettoPoint::random(&mut rng));

// Every 30 bytes of message uses one plaintext attribute. This plaintext
// message is exactly 30 bytes, so it accounts for one attribute total on the
// credential.  If it were one byte longer, it would account for two attributes.
let plaintexts = request.append_plaintext(&String::from("This is a tsunami alert test..").into_bytes());

// Hence we have 4 total attributes, as specified in the generation of the
// `system_parameters` above.
let credential_request = request.finish();

// The user now sends `credential_request` to the issuer, who may issue the
// credential, if seen fit to do so.
let issuance = issuer.issue(credential_request, &mut rng).unwrap();

// The issuer sends the `credential_issuance` to the user, who verifies the
// contained proof of correct issuance.
let mut credential = issuance.verify(&system_parameters, &issuer_parameters).unwrap();

// Optionally, upon showing the credential, the user can create a
// keypair and encrypt some or all of the attributes.  The master secret
// can be stored to regenerate the full keypair later on.  Encryption
// keys can be rotated to rerandomise the encrypted attributes.
let (keypair, master_secret) = SymmetricKeypair::generate(&system_parameters, &mut rng);

// For this presentation, we're going to encrypt the plaintext (the fourth attribute)
// and also mark the first attribute, a scalar, as being hidden. Remember that
// indexing starts at 0.
credential.hide_attribute(0);
credential.hide_attribute(3);

// The user now creates a presentation of the credential to give to the issuer.
let presentation = credential.show(&system_parameters, &issuer_parameters, Some(&keypair), &mut rng).unwrap();

// The user then sends this presentation to the issuer, who verifies it.
let verification = issuer.verify(&presentation);

assert!(verification.is_ok());

TODO

  • [] Add DLEQ proofs between the C_y commitments to hidden group attributes and the corresponding proofs of encryption.

Dependencies

~3.5MB
~71K SLoC